Realistic or Utopian? Coordinating Transit and Land Use to Achieve Equitable Transit-Oriented Development by Carlton, Ian
Portland State University
PDXScholar
TREC Friday Seminar Series Transportation Research and Education Center(TREC)
11-18-2016
Realistic or Utopian? Coordinating Transit and Land Use to
Achieve Equitable Transit-Oriented Development
Ian Carlton
EcoNorthwest
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/trec_seminar
Part of the Transportation Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and
Planning Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in TREC Friday Seminar Series by an authorized administrator
of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carlton, Ian, "Realistic or Utopian? Coordinating Transit and Land Use to Achieve Equitable Transit-Oriented Development" (2016).





November 18, 2016 
Realistic or Utopian? 
Coordinating Transit and Land Use to Achieve 





1.  Market	  does	  not	  deliver	  TOD	  where	  we	  
want	  it,	  let	  alone	  complicated	  E-­‐TOD	  
2.  Ineﬀec?ve	  to	  deliver	  E-­‐TOD	  within	  our	  
predominant	  market-­‐based	  system	  
3.  Could	  modiﬁed/new	  real	  estate	  
development	  ins?tu?ons	  deliver	  E-­‐TOD?	  
E-TOD quantity, pitfalls, & success factors
Transit planners disappointed in TOD quantity
Carlton,	  Ian;	  “Transit	  Planning	  Prac?ce	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Transit	  Oriented	  Development”;	  UC	  Berkeley	  Disserta?on;	  2013	  
Hamstrung by faith in (fear of) transit impacts
“We	  need	  
inclusionary	  
zoning	  or	  the	  
equivalent	  at	  
every	  one	  of	  
these	  sta?ons.”	  
–  L.A.	  Housing	  
stakeholder	  
Proximity	  to	  transit	  sta4ons	  can	  
impact	  prices	  and	  land	  values	  
–  e.g.,	  Chatman	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Duncan,	  2011;	  Rodriguez	  and	  
Mojica,	  2009;	  Hess	  and	  Almeida,	  2007;	  Cervero	  and	  Duncan,	  
2002;	  Strand	  and	  Vågnes,	  2001;	  Lewis-­‐Workman	  and	  Brod,	  
1997;	  Cervero	  and	  Landis,	  1997;	  Benjamin	  and	  Sirmans,	  1996;	  
Bajic,	  1983	  
Data is full of variation – presents averages
Demand	  impact	  can…	  	  
•  …be	  quite	  small	  
•  …be	  nega4ve	  
•  …vary	  between	  
submarkets	  
•  …be	  inadequate	  to	  
inﬂuence	  
development	  
E-TODs stalled due to financial/market factors
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  Central,	  






































Carlton,	  Ian	  and	  Will	  Fleissig;	  “Steps	  to	  Avoid	  Stalled	  Equitable	  TOD	  Projects”;	  Living	  Ci?es;	  2014	  
Markets matter to E-TOD success
Avalon	  Bay’s	  project	  in	  Walnut	  Creek,	  CA	  
includes	  20%	  aﬀordable	  housing,	  public	  
parks,	  ground	  ﬂoor	  retail,	  structured	  
parking.	  The	  development	  relied	  on	  TIF	  
proceeds	  and	  a	  complex	  site	  procurement	  
contract	  with	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Rapid	  Transit	  
District.	  
McCormack	  Baron	  Salazar’s	  project	  at	  
MacArthur	  Park	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  CA	  
includes	  90	  aﬀordable	  apartments,	  
ground	  ﬂoor	  retail,	  and	  commuter	  
parking	  stalls	  for	  transit	  patrons.	  The	  
development	  relied	  on	  10	  diﬀerent	  
ﬁnancial	  sources,	  including	  several	  that	  
par?ally	  funded	  the	  construc?on	  of	  
retail	  space	  that	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  
market	  rents.	  
Image	  source:	  Avalon	  Bay,	  MBS	  
Hamstrung by erroneous view of real estate
“If	  we	  could	  just	  
get	  the	  locals	  to	  
zone	  TODs	  right,	  
the	  developers	  
would	  make	  a	  
killing	  and	  pour	  




“In	  our	  work	  we	  were	  repeatedly	  
struck	  by	  the	  extreme	  lack	  of	  
communica4on	  and	  mutual	  
understanding	  between	  transit	  
planners	  and	  private-­‐sector	  real	  
estate	  interests.	  […]	  Research	  
into	  the	  tools	  and	  decision-­‐
making	  processes	  within	  the	  real	  
estate	  market	  would	  provide	  a	  
valuable	  resource	  for	  planners.”	  
	  
–  Knight	  and	  Trygg,	  1977	  p.	  207	  











Capital	  is	  mobile	  
Highest	  and	  	  
Best	  Use	  
Net Cash Flow Distributions (“Waterfall”) 
Internal	  Rate	  	  



















Investor	   Developer	  
Residual Land Value
RLV	  =	  Developer	  Maximum	  Land	  Budget	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4 over 1 
Stacked Flat 
4 over 1 (podium) 
Residual	  Land	  Value	  by	  Construc?on	  Prototype	  






Financially feasible building types
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Financially feasible building types
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4 over 1 (podium) 
Residual	  Land	  Value	  by	  Construc?on	  Prototype	  
RLV	  =	  $	  per	  gross	  square	  foot	  of	  land	  
Including	  Aﬀordable	  Housing	  
(e.g.,	  20%	  of	  units	  at	  80%AMI)	  
The Impact of Affordable Units Without Incentives
 
From res. tower to 4 over 1
From 4 over 1 to stacked flats
From stacked flats to infeasible
No change (still feasible)
No change (still not feasible)
Insufficient data
How does the setaside change feasibility?
IZ	  Policy	  
20%	  Set	  Aside	  	  
80%	  of	  MFI	  












	  $2.50	  	   	  $3.00	  	   	  $3.50	  	   	  $4.00	  	  
Rent	  per	  Square	  Foot	  
Lower Residual Land Values
Stacked Flats 
Residential Tower 
4 over 1 (podium) 
Residual	  Land	  Value	  by	  Construc?on	  Prototype	  
RLV	  =	  $	  per	  gross	  square	  foot	  of	  land	  
Offsetting Financial Incentives
The Economics of Inclusionary Development  |  25
Section III: Optimizing the Effectiveness of Incentives for Inclusionary Development
Incentives are required to accompany IZ in most settings 
to ensure the desired development and avoid adverse 
effects in the market. They key question is: what type and 
mix of incentives makes most sense? The answer is that 
it depends on local market (and submarket) conditions 
and development product type, as summarized in 
Section I. The value of incentives will also need to reflect 
the costs (in lost economic value) of the affordability 
set aside and income targeting goals, as discussed in 
Section II. 
Local communities have four primary incentives available 
to encourage multifamily development, any and all of 
which can complement an inclusionary zoning program. 
These incentives are detailed in the table at right.
To understand how developers would respond to incentives given a particular 
construction type (stacked flat, four over one, and residential tower) and local market 
conditions (rent/purchase price, construction costs, land prices, etc.), we used building 
prototypes and pro formas to standardize the financial analysis. To aid in conducting 




One-time funds that defray 
construction related costs
Land write downs, grants, low- 
or no-interest loans
Tax abatements 
or other operating 
subsidies
 
Regular payments or operating 
cost reductions
Property tax abatements are the 




Allow developers to provide 
fewer parking stalls than would 
otherwise be required
Exempt affordable units from 
parking requirements
Density bonuses Allow developers to build larger buildings than otherwise 
allowed
Increase allowable height or 
floor area ratio in exchange for 
the provision of affordable units
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Section III: Optimizing the Effectiveness of Incentives for Inclusionary Development
Incentives are required to accompany IZ in most settings 
to ensure the desired development and avoid adverse 
effects in the m rket. They k y question is: what type and 
mix of incentive  makes most sense? The answer is that 
it depends on loc l market (and submarket) conditions 
and development pr duct type, as summarized in 
Section I. The value of i centives will also need to reflect 
the costs (in lost economic value) of the affordability 
set side and income targeting goals, as discussed in 
S ction II. 
Local communities have four primary incentiv s avail ble 
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prototypes and pro formas to standardize the financial analysis. To aid in conducting 




One-time funds that defray 
construction related co ts
Land write downs, grants, low- 
r no-interest loans
Tax abatements 
or other operating 
subsidies
 
Regular payments or operating 
cost reductions
Property tax abatements are the 
most common form of operating 
subsidy
Reduce  parking 
requir ments
Allow developers to provide 
f wer parking stalls than would 
otherwise be required
Exempt affordable units from 
parking requirements
Density bonuses Allow evel pers to build larger buildings than otherwise 
allowed
Increase allowable height or 
floor area ratio in exchange for 
the provision of affordable units
Optimizing the Effectiveness of Incentives for Inclusionary Development
Dire t	  Subsidies	  
Opera?ng	  Subsidies	  














Real estate development as institution
“Ins4tu4ons	  are	  the	  humanly	  devised	  
constraints	  that	  structure	  poli4cal,	  
economic	  and	  social	  interac4on.	  […]	  
Together	  with	  the	  standard	  constraints	  of	  
economics	  they	  deﬁne	  the	  choice	  set	  and	  
therefore	  determine	  transac4on	  and	  
produc4on	  costs	  and	  hence	  the	  
proﬁtability	  and	  feasibility	  of	  engaging	  in	  
economic	  ac4vity.”	  	  
–  Douglas	  North	  “Ins?tu?ons”	  1991	  
Parallel	  
Housing Production Systems & Policies
Dominant	   Support	  
•  Home	  builders	  
•  Mul?family	  ﬁrms	  
•  Inﬁll	  developers	  
•  PDC	  
•  MULTE	  










Expand Support Systems for E-TOD?





Prioritize E-TOD in Measure 26-179?
Beyond	  transporta?on	  





How	  will	  funding	  from	  
the	  housing	  bond	  be	  
targeted	  to	  eﬃcient	  
loca?ons?	  
Parallel	  
Focus Parallel Systems on E-TOD?












5	  of	  34,791	  projects	  
Zuk,	  Miriam	  and	  Ian	  Carlton;	  “Equitable	  Transit-­‐Oriented	  Development:	  Examining	  the	  Progress	  and	  Con?nued	  Challenges	  of	  
Developing	  Aﬀordable	  Housing	  in	  Opportunity	  and	  Transit-­‐Rich	  Neighborhoods”	  Poverty	  &	  Race	  Research	  Ac?on	  Council;	  2015	  
Prioritize E-TOD in parallel systems?
States	  can	  modify	  
thresholds,	  set-­‐
asides,	  and	  weights	  in	  
their	  LIHTC	  QAPs	  to	  
encourage	  E-­‐TOD	  
projects,	  which	  has	  
eﬀec?vely	  inﬂuenced	  
loca?on	  choices.*	  
*	  Ellen	  et	  al.	  “Eﬀect	  of	  QAP	  Incen?ves	  on	  the	  Loca?on	  of	  LIHTC	  Proper?es”	  2015	  
Nedwick	  et	  al	  “How	  Can	  the	  Low	  Income	  Housing	  Tax	  
Credit	  Program	  Most	  Eﬀec?vely	  be	  Used	  to	  Provide	  
Aﬀordable	  Rental	  Housing	  near	  Transit?“	  2014	  
Parallel	  
Create New Parallel System Focused on E-TOD?





Further integrate transit & land use (e.g.,  Asia)?
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  opera?ons	  in	  transit	  budgets	  
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  construc?on	  in	  transit	  budgets	  
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  land	  as	  part	  of	  transit	  projects	  
•  Reward	  agencies	  on	  ex-­‐post	  E-­‐TOD	  outcomes	  
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  planning	  as	  part	  of	  transit	  planning	  
•  Make	  E-­‐TOD	  a	  considera?on	  of	  transit	  plans	  
























System	   Alignment	   Sta4on	  loca4on	   Sta4on	  layout	  
Transit planners’ E-TOD consideration helpful?
Carlton,	  Ian;	  “Transit	  Planning	  Prac?ce	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Transit	  Oriented	  Development”;	  UC	  Berkeley	  Disserta?on;	  2013	  
Further integrate transit & land use (e.g.,  Asia)
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  budgets	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  as	  part	  of	  transit	  planning	  
•  Make	  E-­‐TOD	  a	  considera?on	  of	  transit	  plans	  




















FTA project evaluations contemplate E-TOD
Economic	  
Development	  Score	  –	  
“Future	  Land	  Use”	  
Transit	  Suppor?ve	  
Plans	  and	  Policies	  
Growth	  Management	  
Transit	  Suppor?ve	  Corridor	  Policies	  
Suppor?ve	  Zoning	  
Tools	  to	  Implement	  Plans	  and	  Policies	  
Performance	  and	  
Impact	  of	  Plans	  and	  
Policies	  
Cases	  of	  Development	  
Sta?on	  Area	  Development	  Proposals	  
Adaptability	  of	  Sta?on	  Land	  
Corridor	  Economic	  Environment	  
Aﬀordable	  Housing	  
Need	  and	  Supply	  
Adopted	  Tools	  and	  Strategies	  
Evidence	  of	  Developer	  Ac?vity	  
Support	  for	  Very/Extremely	  Low	  Income	  
Further integrate transit & land use (e.g.,  Asia)
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  opera?ons	  in	  transit	  budgets	  
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  construc?on	  in	  transit	  	  budgets	  
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  land	  as	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  of	  transit	  projects	  
•  Reward	  agencies	  on	  ex-­‐post	  E-­‐TOD	  outcomes	  
•  Fund	  E-­‐TOD	  planning	  as	  part	  of	  transit	  planning	  
•  Make	  E-­‐TOD	  a	  considera?on	  of	  transit	  plans	  




















Ex-post evaluations do not consider (E)TOD
$	  






Further integrate transit & land use (e.g.,  Asia)?
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•  Reward	  agencies	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1.  Market	  does	  not	  deliver	  TOD	  where	  we	  
want	  it,	  let	  alone	  complicated	  E-­‐TOD	  
2.  Ineﬀec?ve	  to	  deliver	  E-­‐TOD	  within	  our	  
predominant	  market-­‐based	  system	  
3.  Could	  modiﬁed/new	  real	  estate	  





Made	  in	  Portland	  &	  San	  Francisco	  
